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SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION

JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION
ON
A JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROMOTE THE MAINTENANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA

AUGUST 6, 1964



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and the Committee on Armed Services

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NOTE.—Although this executive session hearing was held on August 6, 1964, no action was taken to make it public at that time. With the increasing involvement of American forces in Vietnam, however, interest was focused on the background of Senate action on the southeast Asia resolution and on March 4, 1966, the Committee on Foreign Relations agreed to publication of the transcript subject to such national security deletions as might be recommended by the executive branch (see State Department letter on p. 36) and subject to approval of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. The transcript was released in November 1966. All deletions are indicated by the notation "[Deleted]".

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SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION

THURSDAY, AUGUST 6, 1964

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
AND COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present on Committee on Armed Services: Senators Russell, Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Thurmond, Byrd of West Virginia, Young, Inouye, Saltonstall, Smith, and Case.

Present on Committee on Foreign Relations: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Lausche, Church, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Senator Cooper.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations are meeting jointly to consider Senate Joint Resolution 189. I move that the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, Mr. Fulbright, preside over these hearings, and make to the Senate such report as the two committees meeting jointly may determine to submit.

Those of you who favor that motion will say aye. [Chorus of "ayes."]

Opposed no. [No response.]

The ayes have it unanimously, and the Senator from Arkansas will preside.

(The resolution, S.J. Res. 189, referred to follows:)

[S.J. Res. 189, 88th Cong., 2d sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military, or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator for his motion. We all know why we have gathered this morning. We have the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler with us. I suggest that we hear the opening statements of the witnesses and proceed with questions. I hope we can limit our questions to somewhere in the neighborhood of 5 minutes so that we can each have at least one opportunity. If we have time we can return to certain witnesses.

I think we should begin this morning with Secretary Rusk. Do you have a prepared statement, Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I have prepared a short statement but in the interest of time the committee might wish to let me insert that statement in the record. The members will have copies in front of them. I might then call attention to certain important parts of it and then we can resume the discussion. I do want to give full time for Secretary McNamara to explain to the committee what has happened and give the committee as much time as possible.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Without objection it is so ordered.

Secretary Rusk. I would like first then to turn specifically to the resolution which is in front of the committees.

I now turn to the specifics of the resolution before you.

The preamble, I believe, speaks for itself. It spells out in the simplest and shortest terms possible the fact of North Vietnamese attacks, their relation to the overall campaign of aggression by North Vietnam, and the purposes and objectives of the United States in southeast Asia.

As to the operative sections of the resolution, section 1 declares the approval and support of the Congress for actions, in response to armed attack on U.S. forces, which the President has the authority and obligation to take in his capacity as Commander in Chief.

Turning next to section 2 of the draft resolution, let me make clear at the outset what the resolution does not embrace. It does not cover action to assist any nation not a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or a protocol state.

You will recall the protocol states were South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In the case of Cambodia they have publicly declared they will not utilize their privilege of calling for help as a protocol state under the Southeast Treaty Organization.

In the case of Laos the 1962 accords contained a declaration by the Government of Laos they would not call upon any alliance, or group of nations, for assistance.

Therefore, so long as the 1962 accords are in effect, the Government of Laos would be barred from calling on that assistance unless the relevant portions of those particular agreements had in fact withered away.

This resolution does not cover any action in support of a nation unless such nation requests it. It does not cover any action to resist aggression that is not Communist in origin. The Southeast Asia Treaty includes a U.S. understanding that is directed solely against "Communist aggression."

The language, "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force," is similar to the authority embraced in the Formosa Resolution of 1955, the Middle East Resolution of 1957, and the Cuba Resolution of 1962.

Copies of each of these have been made available to you for comparative purposes. The Formosa Resolution authorized the President "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States."

The Middle East Resolution stated that the United States was "prepared to use armed forces." The nearest parallel to the language of the present resolution is in the first clause of the Cuba Resolution, that the United States is "determined * * * to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms," Cuban subversive activities extending to any part of the hemisphere.

PRECEDENTS OF SUCH PRESIDENTIAL ACTION

I shall not take your time this morning to review the constitutional aspect of resolutions of this character. I believe it to be the generally accepted constitutional view that the President has the constitutional authority to take at least limited armed action in defense of American national interests; in at least 85 instances, Presidents of the United States have in fact taken such action.

As I have said before, we cannot now be sure what actions may be required. The Formosa Resolution of 1955 was followed by the use of U.S. warships to escort supply convoys to the offshore islands in 1958; the Middle East Resolution was followed by President Eisenhower's sending of troops to Lebanon in 1958; the Cuba Resolution was followed by the well-known events of October 1962.

I do not suggest that any of these actions may serve as a parallel for what may be required in southeast Asia. There can be no doubt, however, that these previous resolutions form a solid legal precedent for the action now proposed. Such action is required to make the purposes of the United States clear and to protect our national interests.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one comment to this statement, and that is that this resolution, and this consultation which the executive and the legislative branches are now having in the course of today, will in no sense be the last contact between the executive and the legislative branches on these problems in southeast Asia. There will continue to be regular consultations not only with committees but between the President and the congressional leaders, and on a bipartisan basis. That has been the practice of Presidents in this postwar period.

Therefore, as the southeast Asia situation develops, and if it develops, in ways which we cannot now anticipate, of course there will be close and continuous consultation between the President and the leaders of the Congress.

Well now, the important aspect of this resolution is, I venture to suggest, not so much in the constitutional field as in the broad political field here and abroad. We have, since 1945, been engaged in an effort to bring about a peaceful world situation. The main thrust of that has necessarily been to bring to a halt the kind of armed aggression and subversion and infiltration which have come, both as a matter of doctrine and as a matter of practice, out of the Communist world.

We feel that it is very important that this country on as unified a basis as possible make it quite clear to the entire world that we are prepared to take the steps that may be required to insure the security of those to whom we are committed, and to bring such aggression to a halt. That is the primary purpose of this particular action today. And we very much appreciate the speed with which the Congress has turned its attention to this problem and hope very much that a unified and prompt action can be taken.

The rest of the statement is in front of you. I would be glad to go into questions at a later stage but, Mr. Chairman, you might wish to hear from the Secretary of Defense at this point.

(The full statement of Secretary Rusk follows:)

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK

Chairman Fulbright, Chairman Russell, and members of the committees, I appear before you in support of the Joint Congressional Resolution on Southeast Asia now before your committees. If the committees are agreeable, I shall proceed by explaining the purpose of the Resolution. Secretary McNamara will then describe to you the recent attacks on our naval vessels and the U.S. response thereto. I would then propose to conclude by going over the text of the Resolution itself and discussing its meaning and scope.

The immediate occasion for this Resolution is of course the North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels, operating in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, on August 2nd and August 4th.

However, it is obvious that these attacks were not an isolated event but are related directly to the aggressive posture of North Vietnam and to the policy that the United States has been pursuing in assisting the free nations of Southeast Asia and particularly South Vietnam and Laos, to defend themselves against Communist aggression, and thus to preserve the peace of the area.

When Indochina was divided and the independent states of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were created under the conditions of the Geneva Accords of 1954, it was at once clear that in the face of the North Vietnamese threat South Vietnam and Laos could not maintain their independence without outside assistance. The Government of South Vietnam turned to the United States for such assistance, and President Eisenhower in December 1954 made the decision that it should be furnished, stating that our purpose was to "assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

In the fall of 1954, Secretary Dulles negotiated, and the Senate in early 1955 consented to, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, sometimes known as the Manila Pact. This treaty provided for the collective defense of the parties to this treaty—Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. It provided further that the protection of the treaty should extend, under an annexed protocol, to the territory of South Vietnam and to Laos and Cambodia.

I do not need to review for you the subsequent history of North Vietnamese efforts to subvert and conquer South Vietnam and to do the same in Laos. Having found that South Vietnam would not collapse of itself but was on the contrary making remarkable progress, Hanoi in 1959 initiated a systematic campaign of terror and subversion in South Vietnam, directed and supplied with key personnel and equipment from the north. By 1961, the situation had reached a critical point and the United States greatly increased its advisory and supporting assistance to the Government of South Vietnam.

Despite this assistance, the task of countering the extensive Viet Cong effort remains a long and arduous one, and as you know we have moved within the last

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two weeks to further increase our support while recognizing always that the struggle in South Vietnam must essentially be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese themselves.

In Laos, the agreements reached at Geneva in 1962 have been consistently violated by Hanoi and in May of this year the situation took on a more critical character when a Communist military offensive drove neutralist forces from the area of the Plain of Jars they had held in 1962. Our responses to these events, including the provision of additional T-28's to the Government of Laos [deleted] are well known to you.

The present attacks, then, are no isolated event. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam, control or conquer Laos, and thus weaken and eventually dominate and conquer other free nations of Southeast Asia. One does not need to spell out a "domino theory;" it is enough to recognize the true nature of the Communist doctrine of world revolution and the militant support that Hanoi and Peiping are giving to that doctrine in Southeast Asia.

U.S. policy and objectives

Although the United States did not itself sign the Geneva Accords of 1954, Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith made a formal statement that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." We have repeatedly made clear that the independence and security provided for South Vietnam under those Accords was a satisfactory status for South Vietnam. All that is needed, as I have myself often said, is for Hanoi and Peiping to leave their neighbors alone.

The same is true with respect to the 1962 Accords for Laos. These provided a reasonable arrangement for the status of Laos, and what is needed, again, is simply that the Communist side should honor the commitments it undertook.

Above all, there can be no doubt of United States objectives for these nations and for the area as a whole. Here, as elsewhere, we believe that nations are entitled to remain free and to develop as they see fit. The United States has no military, territorial, or political ambitions for itself in Southeast Asia. We seek only the restoration of peace and the removal of Communist subversion and aggression.

Essentially, the outcome of this conflict, and the course of events in the area as a whole, is up to the Communist side. It has the option of accepting the freedom and independence of neighboring nations, or of continuing its aggressive tactics. For our part, as President Johnson stated on June 23: "The United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. But the United States is determined to use its strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror and aggression. We are a people of peace—but not of weakness or timidity."

Purpose of the resolution

This, then, is the background of the Resolution before you. We have never doubted the support of the American people for the policies that have been followed through three administrations over a period of a decade. But in the face of the heightened aggression on the Communist side, exemplified by these latest North Vietnamese attacks, it has seemed clearly wise to seek in the most emphatic form a declaration of Congressional support both for the defense of our armed forces against similar attacks and for the carrying forward of whatever steps may become necessary to assist the free nations covered by the Southeast Asia Treaty.

We cannot tell what steps may in the future be required to meet Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. The unity and determination of the American people, through their Congress, should be declared in terms so firm that they cannot possibly be mistaken by other nations. The world has learned over 50 years of history that aggression is invited if there is doubt about the response. Let us leave today's aggressors in no doubt whatever.

I now turn to Secretary McNamara, who will describe the recent attacks and our response.

I now turn to the specifics of the Resolution before you.

The preamble, I believe, speaks for itself. It spells out in the simplest and shortest terms possible the fact of North Vietnamese attacks, their relation to the over-all campaign of aggression by North Vietnam, and the purposes and objectives of the United States in Southeast Asia.

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Chairman FULBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I prepared a statement which is available to members of the committee that outlines the events that led up to the attack of the U.S. forces on August 4. You will recall that our destroyer *Maddox* operating in international waters was attacked on the 2d; *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy* on the 4th and we responded on the 4th, Washington time.

I would be happy to read this statement, it is seven pages, or answer questions about the details, whichever you choose.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. If you would care to, put it in the record. Most of us have heard the facts but if you could highlight it.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would be happy to do so.

The attack of August 2, you will recall, was by three North Vietnamese patrol boats against the destroyer *Maddox* operating in the Gulf of Tonkin between Hainan Island at the North Vietnamese coast in international waters between 25 and 30 miles off the coast.

Three PT boats attacked the *Maddox*, launched torpedoes against it; *Maddox* returned fire with her 5-inch guns, believed they destroyed one of the boats, the other two were destroyed either by the *Maddox* or the carrier *Ticonderoga's* planes which you can see positioned south of Hainan Island.

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I reported on Monday in my briefings to the Congress that I believed this to be an isolated incident, perhaps a miscalculation or misunderstanding by the North Vietnamese, and we did not anticipate it would be repeated.

Contrary to my estimate it was repeated on August 4 at which time between three and six North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy* which had been sent to accompany it on its patrol course.

At this time the vessels were about 60 miles off the coast of North Vietnam. The attack occurred at night. It appeared to be a deliberate attack in the nature of an ambush.

Torpedoes were launched, automatic weapons fire was directed against the vessels. They returned the fire. Aircraft from the *Ticonderoga* and by this time the *Constellation* which had been brought down [deleted] to support the *Ticonderoga*, were sent over the vessels and returned the patrol boat's fire.

We believe that two of the patrol boats were destroyed as a result of the fire. Engagement was broken off after 2 to 3 hours of fire. The meetings in Washington you are familiar with, the following day.

The President decided that this deliberate attack, and it was clearly a deliberate attack, a preplanned attack, required a military response. We, therefore, launched in the daylight hours about noon-time local time about midnight on August 5, 12:30 in the morning August 5, against the bases from which these boats had come, against the boats themselves, and against certain support facilities, particularly a petroleum depot at Vinh; 64 sorties were directed against these targets. We believe that about 25 boats were damaged or destroyed, certain shore facilities were destroyed. About 90 percent of the Vinh petroleum depot which contains about 10 percent of the total storage capacity of petroleum in North Vietnam was destroyed.

We think there were very few civilian casualties because these bases and the depot were in isolated portions of North Vietnam.

Our losses were two aircraft destroyed, two pilots lost, and two aircraft very slightly damaged.

The patrol is being resumed and will continue its normal course southward in the Gulf of Tonkin.

(The full statement of Secretary McNamara follows:)

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Chairman Fulbright, Chairman Russell, and members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, during the past few days, deliberate and unprovoked military attacks by the North Vietnamese have given rise to the need for us to appear here today. I should like to review the attacks with you briefly and to describe the responses we made to those attacks.

The first incident occurred on August 2. It concerned the USS MADDUX, one of our destroyers engaged in a routine patrol in International waters of the Gulf of Tonkin off the North Viet Nam coast. At about noon, when the MADDUX was about 30 miles from the coast, she reported that three torpedo boats were on a southerly course heading toward the ship at a range of over 10 miles.

Two hours later, at approximately 2:40 P.M., the MADDUX was approached by a high speed—45 to 50 knot—craft. She reported that the apparent intention of this craft was to conduct a torpedo attack and that she intended to open fire in self-defense if necessary. She was attacked by the three PT craft at 3:08 P.M. She opened fire with her five-inch battery after three warning shots failed to slow down the attackers. The PTs continued their closing maneuvers, and two of the PTs closed to 5,000 yards, each firing one torpedo. The MADDUX changed

course in an evasive move and the two torpedoes passed on the starboard side at a distance of 100 to 200 yards.

The USS TICONDEROGA, which was operating in waters to the southeast and which had been alerted to the impending attack, advised she was sending four already airborne F-8E (CRUSADER) fighters with rockets and 20 mm ammunition to provide air cover for the MADDOX. At about 3:21 P.M., the third hostile PT moved up to the beam of the MADDOX and received a direct hit by a five-inch round; at the same time it dropped a torpedo into the water which was not seen to run. Machine gun fire from the PTs was directed at the MADDOX. However, there was no injury to personnel and no damage. The MADDOX continued in a southerly direction to join with a sister destroyer, the C. TURNER JOY, as TICONDEROGA aircraft commenced attacking the PTs. ZUNI rocket runs and 20 mm strafing attacks were directed against two of the PTs, and they were damaged. The third PT remained dead in the water after the direct hit by the MADDOX. At 3:29 P.M., the engagement terminated and the aircraft escorted the MADDOX southward on its patrol course.

On Monday, August 3, the President made public instructions that he had issued the day before regarding future patrols and engagements with enemy craft. He instructed the Navy, first, to continue the patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin; second, to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol; third, to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers; and fourth, to issue instructions to the combat aircraft and to the destroyers (a) to attack any force which attacked them in international waters, and (b) to attack with the objective of not only driving off the force but of destroying it.

At the same time as these instructions were being broadcast throughout the world, the State Department, acting pursuant to the President's further instructions, took steps to deliver a note of protest to the North Vietnam regime. The note was also widely publicized. It concluded with the words, "The United States Government expects that the authorities of the regime in North Viet-Nam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces."

Our hopes that the firm defensive action taken in response to the first attack and the protest to Hanoi would end the matter were short-lived.

After the first attack on Sunday, the MADDOX joined with its sister destroyer, the USS TURNER JOY, in the Gulf of Tonkin and resumed its patrol in international waters, as directed by the President.

Monday, August 3, was uneventful.

The patrol was also uneventful during most of the daylight hours of Tuesday, August 4. In the early evening of August 4, however, the MADDOX reported radar contact with unidentified surface vessels who were paralleling its track and the track of the TURNER JOY. It was 7:40 P.M. when the MADDOX reported that, from actions being taken by those unidentified vessels, an attack by them appeared imminent. At this time the MADDOX was heading southeast near the center of the Gulf of Tonkin in International waters approximately 65 miles from the nearest land.

The MADDOX at 8:36 P.M. established new radar contact with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. At this time, U.S. fighter aircraft were launched from the TICONDEROGA to rendezvous with the MADDOX and the TURNER JOY to provide protection against possible attack from the unidentified vessels and aircraft, in accordance with the President's previously issued directives. Shortly thereafter, the MADDOX reported that the unidentified aircraft had disappeared from its radar screen and that the surface vessels were remaining at a distance. The aircraft from the TICONDEROGA arrived and commenced defensive patrol over the MADDOX and the TURNER JOY.

At 9:30 P.M., additional unidentified vessels were observed on the MADDOX radar, and these vessels began to close rapidly on the destroyer patrol at speeds in excess of 40 knots. The attacking craft continued to close rapidly from the west and south and the MADDOX reported that their intentions were evaluated as hostile. The destroyers reported at 9:52 P.M. that they were under continuous torpedo attack and were engaged in defensive counterfire.

Within the next hour, the destroyers relayed messages stating that they had avoided a number of torpedoes, that they had been under repeated attack, and that

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they had sunk two of the attacking craft. By Midnight local time, the destroyers reported that, even though many torpedoes had been fired at them, they had suffered no hits nor casualties and that the defensive aircraft from the TICONDEROGA were illuminating the area and attacking the enemy surface craft. Shortly thereafter, they reported that at least two enemy craft had been sunk although low ceilings continued to hamper the aircraft operations. The TURNER JOY reported that during the engagement, in addition to the torpedo attack, she was fired upon by automatic weapons while being illuminated by searchlights.

Finally, after more than two hours under attack, the destroyers reported at 1:30 A.M. that the attacking craft had apparently broken off the engagement.

The deliberate and unprovoked nature of the attacks at locations that were indisputably in international waters compelled the President and his principal advisers to conclude that a prompt and firm military response was required. Accordingly, the President decided that air action, in reply to the unprovoked attacks, should be taken against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which had been used in the hostile operations. On Tuesday evening, after consulting with Congressional leadership, he so informed the American people.

The United States military response was carefully planned and effectively carried out. The U.S. air strikes began approximately at noon Wednesday local time against North Vietnamese PT and gun boats, their bases and support facilities. These reprisal attacks, carried out by naval aircraft of the United States Seventh Fleet from the carriers TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION, were limited in scale—their primary targets being the weapons against which our patrolling destroyers had been forced to defend themselves twice in the prior 72 hours.

Specifically, our naval air forces launched 64 attack sorties against 4 North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and their boats and against a major supporting oil storage depot. Strike reports indicate that all targets were severely hit, in particular the petroleum installation where 10% of North Vietnam's petroleum storage capacity was 90% destroyed. Smoke was observed rising to 14,000 feet. Some 25 North Vietnamese patrol boats were destroyed or damaged.

Our losses were two aircraft destroyed and two damaged. One of the pilots is believed to have crashed with his plane between two PT craft he had under attack. Another pilot reported that he was ejecting from his downed aircraft. His whereabouts is at present listed as unknown.

In view of the unprovoked and deliberate attacks in international waters on our naval vessels and bearing in mind that the best way to deter escalation is to be prepared for it, the President and his principal advisers concluded that additional precautionary measures were required in Southeast Asia. Certain military deployments to the area are therefore now underway. These include:

- a. Transfer of an attack carrier group from the Pacific Coast to the Western Pacific;
 - b. Movement of interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft into South Vietnam;
 - c. Movement of fighter bomber aircraft into Thailand;
 - d. Transfer of interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons from the United States to advance bases in the Pacific;
 - e. Movement of an antisubmarine force into the South China Sea;
 - f. The alerting and reading for movement of selected Army and Marine forces.
- In the meantime, U.S. destroyers with protective air cover as needed, continue their patrol in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin.

The moves we have taken to reinforce our forces in the Pacific are in my judgment sufficient for the time being. Other reinforcing steps can be taken very rapidly if the situation requires.

This concludes my descriptions of the two deliberate and unprovoked North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. naval vessels on the high seas; of the United States reprisal against the offending boats, their bases and related facilities; and of the precautionary deployment and alerting steps we have taken to guard against any eventuality.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Wheeler, do you wish to add anything?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER, CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General WHEELER. I have no statement, sir, except to state that the action that was taken was considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unanimously recommended to the Secretary of Defense and later on to the President, to President Johnson, as being the response which the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought was appropriate under the circumstances, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Well, gentlemen, I don't wish to ask any questions. I only want to make a very brief statement. The promptness and decision with which all of you exhibited on this occasion was commendable and I also think the restraint with which you used overwhelming power in the area is a new attitude on the part of a great power that is extremely beneficial and I think will be effective.

Senator Russell?

Chairman RUSSELL. I would like to suggest that the resolution referred to by the Secretary of State be inserted in the record following his remarks.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Without objection.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary McNamara, do you have any theory with respect to these unidentified aircraft picked up on radar?

Secretary McNAMARA. We have no information other than the first report of the *Maddox* that three unidentified aircraft had been discerned on the radar at about the time the radar disclosed the approach of the patrol boats.

There was no action by the aircraft, however, directed against our vessels.

Chairman RUSSELL. Nor against our aircraft the following day?

Secretary McNAMARA. Nor against our aircraft.

Chairman RUSSELL. How is petroleum delivered to North Vietnam, by sea?

Secretary McNAMARA. Principally by sea.

Chairman RUSSELL. It could be cut off then?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; it could be.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have nothing further, I believe, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Sparkman?

SIZE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVY

Senator SPARKMAN. Does North Vietnam have a navy of any strength?

Secretary McNAMARA. We believe it has had about 12 patrol boats known as PT-4's, and something on the order of 30 similar type boats known as Swatow boats, something on the order of 40 to 50 patrol-type vessels, therefore.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have no questions. I would like to make just this comment, particularly regarding Secretary Rusk's statement.

I am glad to see that the resolution has on the face of it a recognition of the constitutional right of the President to take these actions and that this really amounts to confirmation or a ratification by the Congress of the action taken and a pledge to lend all support that may be necessary.

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Is that a correct interpretation?

Secretary RUSK. As you know, sir, the Presidents, since President Jefferson, have taken the view that the President of the United States has the authority to use the Armed Forces—

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe he has.

Secretary RUSK (continuing). To protect American interests. This resolution approves and supports the action taken by the President in the protection of national interests as spelled out in the resolution.

Senator SPARKMAN. Both the Formosa resolution and the Near East resolution recognized that right, too.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Stennis?

WIDE AGREEMENT ON RESOLUTION

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, most of us around the table have been in favor of this resolution. There would be mighty little exception to that but what many of us are interested in is who are involved in this attack. Let's go over it again if you don't mind, whichever one wishes to, who is involved.

What do you know about it and what do you believe about it.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it is very clear that the attack of August 2 and of August 4 was carried out exclusively by patrol craft of North Vietnam. There was an allusion a moment ago to three unidentified aircraft which appeared on the radar screens. Whose aircraft these were, where they came from we don't know but they did not participate in the attack, in any event.

Senator STENNIS. But they were unexplained and unknown?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; we don't know whether they were transport aircraft, combat aircraft. We don't know their point of origin or their purpose.

ROLE OF RED CHINA

Senator STENNIS. Well, the background, what led up to all this. What do you think about the possibility of Red China's direct participation or prompting or indirect, what is your idea?

Secretary McNAMARA. We see no evidence of their direct participation in the attack.

What their counsel may have been from North Vietnam I can't say.

Senator STENNIS. You don't have any intelligence on that?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir; we do not.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I might just add one comment on that.

The immediate action that was here does seem to be exclusively North Vietnamese, but the Chinese Communists have been giving strong public support to the position of North Vietnam, and they recently made a statement on the 6th of August:

Aggression by the United States against North Vietnam means aggression against China. The U.S. Government must stop its armed provocations against the democratic Republic of Vietnam. Otherwise it must be held responsible for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.

It is our impression that the Chinese would give at least very strong political and public support to the North Vietnamese in this situation. We just frankly do not know whether they will translate that into action of any sort. [Deleted.]

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. Senator Stennis, there are Chinese bases on Hainan Island. Our destroyers were operating in this area as were our aircraft.

During the period our destroyers and aircraft were operating on patrol in this area, during the time of the North Vietnamese attack on them, Chinese aircraft were operating out of Hainan Island in this direction. They did not approach our vessels or aircraft and they did not in anyway attack.

Senator STENNIS. Not wanting to take much time, Mr. Chairman, but I feel all are interested and may we call on General Wheeler to say if he had any additional comment to that question?

General WHEELER. I have none, sir. I think Secretary McNamara has covered it. We are confident that the attacks were launched by Vietnamese patrol craft. There was no participation so far as we are aware by any other nationality.

Of course, what support might have been given in the form of counsel or other things of that kind we don't know.

Senator STENNIS. Did you say the extent of that naval power was just about a dozen PT boats?

General WHEELER. They have got about a dozen of these PT boats of the type that made these attacks. They have 30 slightly larger craft but they are also patrol craft known as Swatows and then they have, of course, the usual support installations, smaller craft, barges, and things of that kind.

Senator STENNIS. And this is the extent of their—

General WHEELER. Their navy consisted of about 200 officers and 2,000 enlisted men.

Senator STENNIS. Air power?

General WHEELER. They have no combat aircraft at all.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like to ask Secretary McNamara, where were our two planes lost?

Secretary McNAMARA. One aircraft was lost over Hon Gay which is the most northerly point, as you can see, Hon Gay torpedo boat area, and the other was at Loc Chao.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

In reading the newspaper dispatches it seemed to me that the strikes were at different times, in other words, there were some strikes and then subsequently strikes at other installations.

I was just wondering why the original strikes were not simultaneous so that they would all strike the same time? Because manifestly a strike at one would alert the others.

Secretary McNAMARA. They were off the two carriers, the carriers at the time of launch were not in the position shown on the map: the *Constellation* [deleted] was not in, as far south as is shown there. Its aircraft were required to fly a longer distance than the *Ticonderoga's*, and we knew they would be picked up at time of launch by radar and as it turned out they were, it was a simultaneous launch rather than a

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simultaneous attack which was the important point in relation to the disclosure of intent.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

I only want to say that I think the United States had no other recourse. The decisions were sound. I certainly support the necessity of vigorous and immediate retaliation in this situation. I have no particular questions having gone through this to some extent otherwise.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions.

I think this is, I know that this is, the fourth time since I have been a Member of Congress that we have had these resolutions. I believe the action of the President was essential to defend the prestige of our Armed Forces, and certainly the submission of this resolution is in accordance with our Constitution to have Congress support the President in these defensive actions and I intend to support this resolution wholeheartedly and with my best efforts.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Morse?

U.S. ACTION OPPOSED

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, my views are pretty well known. I am unalterably opposed to this course of action which, in my judgment, is an aggressive course of action on the part of the United States. [Deleted.]

I think what happened is that Khanh got us to backstop him in open aggression against the territorial integrity of North Vietnam. I have listened to briefing after briefing and there isn't a scintilla of evidence in any briefing yet that North Vietnam engaged in any military aggression against South Vietnam either with its ground troops or its navy.

[Deleted.]

Mr. MORSE. I shall vote against the resolution.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I feel compelled to make a brief comment on what the distinguished Senator from Oregon has just said.

Since 1954 the North Vietnamese have been undertaking to undermine and take over the Government of South Vietnam. There was some surcease from those depredations during the years about 1956 to 1958, but in 1959 the North Vietnamese again came back to it, made a decision to step up their activities, and in 1960 publicly proclaimed their purpose.

Now, the shape and form of armed attack and of aggression have been changing in this postwar world. I cannot myself see any lack of aggressiveness or any lack of military action in the infiltration of parties of individuals, some of them running up to 150 and 200 at a time, infiltrating through Laos, contrary to agreements, into South Vietnam contrary to their obligations, for the purpose of carrying on armed action against the authorities and the people of South Vietnam.

So, that I think we ought to try our best to keep very clear who is the aggressor here, and what the purposes of the United States and the free world are. We have helped country after country, through the Marshall plan and NATO right around the world in this postwar period in maintaining their security and independence, and we don't control any of them. We have none of them in any American empire.

The issue here, it seems to me, is a very clear one between a persistent course of aggression and an attempt on our side and the side of our friends in southeast Asia to create independent, secure, and prosperous countries who have a chance to live their own lives without interference from their neighbors.

BASIS OF DISAGREEMENT REVOLVES AROUND ROLE OF
NORTH VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. I don't propose to engage in a debate with the Secretary of State here. I disagree on the basis of the many replies presented, on the basis of his own testimony before this committee when we have asked time after time for evidence from the Secretary of State and the Pentagon Building of any proof of any organized military operation of North Vietnam going into South Vietnam. You have never been able to produce a scintilla of evidence. We have all recognized the vicious infiltration tactics of the Communist system trying to undermine South Vietnam, but it has been going back and forth across the borders. The sad thing is that we were in there all the time when, in my judgment, we shouldn't have been in there except to keep the peace. We ought to have been at the conference table.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, may I respond to this? There have been several misstatements made and I would like to correct them for the record.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Yes.

NO RELATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE
ACTIONS

Secretary McNAMARA. I would like to cover three points. First, [deleted]. The *Maddox* was operating in international waters, was carrying out a routine patrol of the type we carry out all over the world at all times. [Deleted.]

I think it is extremely important that you understand this. If there is any misunderstanding on that we should discuss this point at some length.

Senator MORSE. I think we should.

Secretary McNAMARA. I say this flatly; this is the fact.

Senator MORSE. What was your testimony the other day, Mr. Secretary, on the record [deleted].

Secretary McNAMARA. I testified the other day that the American vessels were, or the American vessel was—it was the *Maddox* at that time—was operating on a southerly course in routine patrol in international waters in this area [deleted].

Senator MORSE. [Deleted.]

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

PROOF OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH

Now if you want to discuss actions by South Vietnam I will discuss them, but before doing so I want to make one other point. This Government has positive proof of the organized effort of North Vietnam to subvert the Government of South Vietnam. It has posi-

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tive proof of the direction of the military actions in South Vietnam by North Vietnam. This proof has been available for a long time. I assume this committee is aware of it. If it isn't aware of it, I will be perfectly happy to expose it to a selected group of members of the committee. There should be no misunderstanding on the part of any of you of the direction of the attempt to subvert the Government of South Vietnam by North Vietnam, of a day-by-day command of that effort, of the continued support of it.

Senator MORSE. I want to make perfectly clear I have never questioned the subversive activities of North Vietnam. But I also want to make perfectly clear, Mr. Secretary, that you have not put in the record of this committee any proof at any time of any overt military operations of North Vietnam into South Vietnam.

We have asked you time and time again; you people come before this committee, "Well, we think a cadre now and then but there has been no organized military invasion of North Vietnam into South Vietnam," that has been the testimony time and time again.

Secretary McNAMARA. I dispute that, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Well, the record will speak for itself.

Secretary McNAMARA. You said there has been none.

I don't know what the record shows because I am not familiar with the record of this committee but I do know there is an organized effort of North Vietnam using men and materiel to destroy the Government of South Vietnam, and we have ample evidence of that, and if this committee wishes to enter into a discussion of that evidence I am perfectly willing to supply it to you, although some of it is so highly classified that I would have to ask you to appoint a selected committee.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REGULAR TROOPS AND INFILTRATORS

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, since I have been before the Foreign Relations Committee a number of times, I would like to point to the distinction between organized units of North Vietnamese in their own uniforms, flying their own flag, coming into South Vietnam, and groups of infiltrators trained and organized by North Vietnam, bearing arms, who come down into South Vietnam, organizing operations against the people of South Vietnam.

This is what I said, what I had in mind, when I said the shape of aggression is changing in the postwar world. That doesn't mean it is not just as much aggression as if they were flying their own flags. There are certain technical distinctions, but the aggression in fact is here.

Senator MORSE. [Deleted.]

That is what the Communists are going to try to play up and I don't think we ought to let ourselves get into that position.

SCOPE OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, may I respond again very briefly to this?

I think you should understand the infiltration of South Vietnam by sea that has taken place for 2½ years, and the degree to which South Vietnam has endeavored to respond to that, and I will cover it very briefly for you.

Between July and December of 1961 there were 140 incidents of infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam by sea. These included infiltration of bazookas. It included infiltration of personnel large as 65 by single junks. There were 1,400 probable or confirmed infiltrations of personnel at that time.

Then South Vietnam had no organized force to combat these infiltrators. They had only 80 sailing junks. None of these were motorized, obviously an ineffective sea patrol. We assisted them in organizing a sea patrol starting in December 1961.

At that time we started their junk force. A portion of that force was financed by military assistance funds. About 500 junks were built. Using those funds, the Vietnamese added about 60 more financed by their own funds. These junks fall in four categories.

There are command junks, about 28 of them, that have a crew of 10, carry automatic weapons and radios. There are about 240 sailing junks that carry out surveillance. These are in a sense pickets or patrols stationed in particular areas carrying out routine surveillance of that area.

There are several hundred motorized sailor junks or motorized junks carrying automatic weapons, patrolling an extended area of the sea. This patrol of some 600 or 700 junks in the 8 months—of the last 8 months of 1963—searched 130,000 junks, searched 350,000 people, discovered 140 Vietcong agents among them.

In the first 7 months of this year, they have searched 149,000 junks, some 570,000 people. This is a tremendous operation endeavoring to close the sea coasts of over 800 miles. [Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. [Deleted.]

Senator SALTONSTALL. [Deleted.]

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Mansfield?

Senator MANSFIELD. No questions.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMUNIST ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS

Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what type of anti-aircraft weapons have been used by North Vietnam to the best of our knowledge?

Secretary McNAMARA. Perhaps General Wheeler can respond.

General WHEELER. No missile, it is all field artillery of the smaller calibers, 57, 37 millimeter and, of course, automatic weapons of various kinds.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did any of our planes rearm and fly two sorties from the carriers?

General WHEELER. A limited number, 14.

Senator SYMINGTON. Fourteen out of sixty-four?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you give details of the F-8E Crusader?

General WHEELER. It is a jet.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you furnish for the record what its characteristics are?

General WHEELER. I will, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You say that, in addition to the torpedo attack on page 4 of your statement, Mr. Secretary, that the *Turner Joy* was fired upon by automatic weapons?

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What is the definition of an automatic weapon?

Secretary McNAMARA. These were probably 3-inch or something that size on the Swatow and/or PT-4 boats.

Senator SYMINGTON. So an automatic weapon would be a 3-inch gun?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And then, not in any sense of criticism but just for information, in page 5 you talk about destroying 90 percent of a tank which was 11 percent of North Vietnam's petroleum.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I ask why you didn't go for more of their petroleum?

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, the remaining portion of their petroleum depots were associated with other parts of their economic system. This seemed very clearly to be associated with the Swatows and, therefore, it was a relevant target attack.

Senator SYMINGTON. Finally, you mentioned the various additional equipment that you are sending out in reinforcement, A, B, C, D, E, F.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you give for the record the type and character of planes?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, perhaps I can put that, insert that, in the record, Senator Symington.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, do our preparations take into consideration the possibility of war with Red China?

Secretary McNAMARA. We have contingency plans, Senator Aiken, which take account of that. [Deleted.]

Senator AIKEN. You are fully prepared then?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. In the case that Red China attacks?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. That is all.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. Secretary, or Secretary McNamara, you referred a while ago to your statement that you made on Monday—

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator SMITH (continuing). About the incident being an isolated one.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Was that because of lack of intelligence or error in judgment?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it was because with hindsight I personally consider the action of the North Vietnamese a form of suicide and I didn't expect them to undertake that.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Senator AIKEN. [Deleted.]

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

Senator AIKEN. I see.

That is all.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Long.

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, to what extent did our people achieve surprise when they struck back at the mainland?

Secretary McNAMARA. There is ample evidence they achieved complete surprise because as General Wheeler pointed out to me yesterday that it is inconceivable that a military force expecting an attack would have its boats lying dead in the water at the base, and this is exactly the way we found most of the North Vietnamese.

Senator LONG. That is the point I had in mind. It sounded from what you say here as though we achieved about—considering the size—that we achieved about the kind of surprise on their navy that the Japanese achieved in Pearl Harbor.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think that is exactly true. That applies to all of the four bases.

Senator LONG. Would you comment on that, General Wheeler?
General WHEELER. Yes, sir; Senator.

U.S. ATTACK A SURPRISE

I believe that our quick and firm reaction took them by tactical surprise, but as the Secretary said, in thinking this one over, I can't imagine any military commander putting his boats into these limited anchorages when he expected an attack on them.

Senator LONG. I suppose it is good that the world be told we have been attacked before we struck back but once I knew that was a deliberate attack on my Government my reaction is you should have struck back as quickly as you could, and I commend you for that.

I will vote for the resolution. I think it is perhaps to the enemy's advantage that we have more international lawyers than they do. My guess is they don't spend as much time arguing about the international niceties about what they are going to do. If they decide they are going to do it they do it. I believe they understood better as soon as you struck back.

As much as I would like to be consulted with on this kind of thing the less time you spend on consulting and the quicker you shoot back the better off you are.

That is what I understand.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. [Deleted.]

Secretary RUSK. [Deleted.]

Senator JACKSON. Thank you.

LITTLE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR RED CHINA

Secretary McNAMARA, I wonder if you could briefly update the committees on the situation with reference to Chinese arms as it has been affected by the withdrawal of the Soviet support, starting apparently in 1960; if that has continued, what impact it has had on the air force and ground forces.

Secretary McNAMARA. We believe that the Chinese have received little support from the Soviet since 1960. It seems unlikely that they have received any modernization of their major weapons systems with but one or two minor exceptions.

The result is that their air force does not include many modern jets. It is made up principally of Mig 15's, 17's, and 19's, and bombers known as the IL-28 which is a relatively obsolete twin-engine jet bomber, plus a bomber known as the Bat which is a twin-engine piston

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bomber. It seems probable that the air force has suffered from lack of spare parts and proper maintenance during that period, because the petroleum supplies have been limited, for the same reasons, the pilot training has almost certainly suffered.

We estimate the number of hours of training each pilot has received per year in the past 3 years is far below the level required for maintenance of proficiency. So, I think we can say their air force is seriously deficient in equipment and competence today.

The ground forces suffered but probably to a lesser degree, since they are able to manufacture some of their own ground force equipment.

They have a tremendous advantage of large numbers of men, and a willingness and capability for subsistence on a very low level of support.

Senator JACKSON. If they should desire to escalate, there is more probability that they would move from a ground point of view rather than air at this time?

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

General WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Senator JACKSON. [Deleted.]

General WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Senator JACKSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Carlson?

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I have been interested in hearing these briefings as to our intelligence.

As I gather this strike on the U.S.S. *Maddox* was a surprise. Press reports indicate there is a continuous infiltration of southern Vietnamese into North Vietnam. [Deleted.]

How good is our intelligence in this area?

Secretary McNAMARA. This is such a highly classified subject, Senator Carlson, it is difficult for me to answer your question fully.

Senator CARLSON. I will not ask you to discuss it then.

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. First, in general, I want to associate myself with those who gave their hearty support to the actions taken by the President and the Secretary. I think it would be unfortunate if we did not support immediate action in response to aggression and on the spot because this is where the decisions are made and anything we do afterward will be affected favorably or adversely by our failure to take action or whatever action we take.

I would like to ask two questions. One, in relation to the resolution. I have not been a member of the committee when any of the former resolutions were presented.

LANGUAGE OF SUCH RESOLUTIONS HAS BEEN CONSISTENT

Have they all had the provision which appears on line 13 on page 2, "As the President determines" or is that unique to this or has it been in some?

Chairman FULBRIGHT. They have had language equivalent to that, the equivalent, "As he deems necessary."

I think that in three previous resolutions, the language is almost the same, either "As he determines" or "As he deems necessary."

Senator CASE. This is the heart of the matter so far as discretion is concerned. At the first briefing we had, after the first strike, I was somewhat concerned at the ineffectiveness of our response. Why didn't we get all of our ships in right away? I don't want to get into classified stuff—but when we had certain air response as well as the guns from the *Maddox*, we were still unable to do more than sink, I believe, one and disable another. We didn't have, as I understand it, homing devices on rockets that either the ships or the aircraft had.

Are you satisfied, Mr. Secretary, and you, General Wheeler, with the adequacy of our capability in this respect?

U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH IS ADEQUATE

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; and I think the strike of yesterday indicates the capability we have.

Perhaps you would like to ask General Wheeler.

General WHEELER. I think you can say, Senator, it is satisfactory. When we spoke to you the other day we really didn't know that one of those boats had been destroyed or not. Later on we determined it had and we also determined that the other two had been fairly heavily damaged, and I think that we can take satisfaction in that. It was a night action and we think we got two more. I think this was good, particularly in the hours of darkness, very dark, as a matter of fact, and then the strikes of yesterday, I think, were most successful. So, I am satisfied with them.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator from New Jersey yield for 30 seconds?

I just wanted to point out that there was great discussion of the Cuban resolution. At the time there was not any authority given the President by direct language. The fact that it wasn't, produced unanimity in committee that considered the situation quite different from both the Formosa and Lebanon resolutions.

Senator CASE. That is all, thank you.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Lausche?

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS OF AUGUST 2, 1964

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to get clear in the record and in my own mind exactly what happened on the 2d. The testimony given thus far indicates that the *Maddox* reported hostile patrol vessels to some superior office and that it believed that those patrol vessels were intent upon hostile action.

Do the records of the vessels show a communication from the *Maddox* to a superior officer stating that they are being followed and that it looked as if hostile action would take place?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think General Wheeler can answer whether the higher headquarters show that.

General WHEELER. The records of higher headquarters do show a stream of communications, a continuous stream of reports, from the *Maddox* back to the task force commander who was on the *Ticonderoga*. What actually happened was that on 3:50, eastern daylight time on the 2d, the *Maddox* was approached by three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats with the apparent intention of launching a

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torpedo attack. That is when the *Maddox* retired to the east at 27 knots.

The torpedo boats came on after her and she got within 9,000 yards which was at 4:08 eastern standard time, the *Maddox* fire three warning shots from a 5-inch battery.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is not what I want. I want to know if your records show a communication; that is, the *Maddox* reporting to the *Ticonderoga* that it looked as though they are going to be subjected to an attack.

General WHEELER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. That would prove the *Maddox* did not precipitate the thing but was awaiting instructions from the *Ticonderoga*.

General WHEELER. That is correct, sir.

Not only that, Senator, we not only have a communication record but the fact that the *Maddox* turned to the eastward and proceeded out to sea.

Senator LAUSCHE. To avoid?

General WHEELER. To avoid any contact with hostile PT boats.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then the *Maddox* did nothing until it was actually fired upon?

General WHEELER. Fired three warning shots when these PT boats approached within 9,000 yards. That was the first action, sir.

Secretary RUSK. Despite the warning shots, the PT boats continued to close at a high speed.

Senator LAUSCHE. Continued to close?

According to your reports the torpedoes were set into motion and it was then that you began your firing.

General WHEELER. That is correct, sir. They came within 5,000, two of them, PT boats came up within 5,000 yards away and launched torpedoes which the *Maddox* evaded by changing her course.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, on August 3, the President made his statement. You appeared before us.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. But there was nothing of any consequence happening in the area.

General WHEELER. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, on August 4, you again have the *Maddox* supposedly reporting radar contact with unidentified surface vessels who were paralleling its track and the track of the *Turner Joy*.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. To whom was that report made by the *Maddox*?

Secretary McNAMARA. That was made by the *Ticonderoga* and, of course, transmitted to higher headquarters, CincPac and Washington as well.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then at 7:40 p.m., the *Maddox* reported again to headquarters that from the actions being taken by those unidentified vessels an attack by them appeared imminent?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, at this time the *Maddox* was heading southeast near the center of the Gulf of Tonkin in international waters approximately 65 miles from the nearest land; 8:36 *Maddox* again established radar contact with two items by vessels. It still did nothing, is that correct?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were there shots fired by the North Vietnamese on the 4th before you went into these lands?

Secretary McNAMARA. Oh, yes: the *Maddox* was attacked as was the *Turner Joy* on the 4th.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you know how many of the torpedoes were set into motion and what small arms were used?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is difficult to estimate. This was a very dark night. This attack was carried out during the night, the hours of darkness. It was a premeditated attack, a preplanned attack. It was described as an ambush in the reports from the commanders, but because it was night it is very difficult to estimate the total amount of fire.

Senator LAUSCHE. The shots were again initiated by the North Vietnamese?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

General WHEELER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. [Deleted.]

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

Senator LAUSCHE. The attacks upon us occurred in international waters?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is right.

General WHEELER. That is right.

First one was 28 miles or 30 miles offshore and the second one was about 65 miles offshore.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then our course would be to either maintain our honor and our security or drop tail and run for the ocean, I suppose?

General WHEELER. That is correct.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Ervin?

Senator ERVIN. I would like to ask Secretary Rusk a couple of questions.

BACKGROUND OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

As I infer from your statement we first became involved in South Vietnam, in this area, in 1954.

Secretary Rusk. Well, in the postwar period we had been giving assistance to France in connection with Indochina. We gave a considerable amount of assistance during that period.

But we became directly involved with the Government of South Vietnam after the partition of Vietnam into two, and after it became apparent to the administration at that time that South Vietnam would require outside assistance if it was to have a chance to maintain its independence.

Senator ERVIN. Did we have any treaty obligation which imposed any duty in that respect on us prior to the making of the SEATO Treaty?

Secretary Rusk. No, sir; there was no treaty obligation. This was on the basis of a request from the Government of Vietnam to us, and our acceptance of that request and action under our aid programs for South Vietnam.

Senator ERVIN. Is it your position that we are now rendering such aid as we are rendering to Vietnam under an obligation assumed by us under the SEATO Treaty.

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Secretary RUSK. Well, there are several aspects of this.

In the first place, the President, we believe, has authority under aid programs and under his own responsibility as President and Commander in Chief to give assistance of the sort we have been giving there.

Of course, all this assistance that is provided, the tangible assistance, is done on the basis of congressional appropriations which are fully discussed here. We do believe that the obligations of the SEATO Treaty are both joint and several, and that the SEATO Treaty is a substantiating basis for our presence there and our effort there, although, however, we are not acting specifically under the SEATO Treaty.

Senator ERVIN. Are our assistance efforts to South Vietnam assisted in any tangible way by any of the other signatories to the SEATO pact?

Secretary RUSK. This is something on which we have not by any means been satisfied. The Government of South Vietnam very recently has addressed communications to 32 other governments asking for their assistance and we are giving that the strongest possible supporting diplomatic effort on our own. We think this is beginning to yield some results, but I would not wish to make too much point of this because we are still very dissatisfied.

But governments—of Japan, Korea, [deleted]—from southeast Asia all around to Europe, are now putting in additional assistance and considering what they can do.

SCOPE OF SEATO SUPPORT

Senator ERVIN. Has the United Kingdom or France or the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan afforded any assistance?

Secretary RUSK. In the case of France, France's assistance in South Vietnam is basically in the field of investment and technical assistance.

They have, for example, a considerable number of teachers there and medical personnel, but they do not have military personnel there and it has been made very clear they do not contemplate putting military personnel in there.

In the case of Britain, they have had some personnel in there. They are pretty well occupied in other areas [deleted]. But they are looking again at what they can do.

Australia has been increasing their help. They have personnel in the field serving as advisers with the South Vietnamese units as we do. [deleted].

New Zealand is adding personnel. [Deleted.]

Pakistan is preoccupied with its problems over Kashmir and with India that there is no indication that they are likely to put in any personnel [deleted].

Senator ERVIN. There is no question about the fact we are actually involved there in South Vietnam and in southeast Asia, is there?

Secretary RUSK. There is no question about it.

Senator ERVIN. Is there any reasonable or honorable way we can extricate ourselves without losing our face and probably our pants?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, the problem of extrication is utterly simple and terribly difficult.

U.S. PRESENCE TO DEFEND INDEPENDENCE

We didn't go there just because we wanted to be there or we wanted a U.S. presence in that area. We went there because the independence of these countries was under direct pressures from the north and direct intervention from the north.

Now, we have been trying to find a basis for establishing the security of these countries in such a way that we are not needed there. In the case of Cambodia we had supported over a period of some years their independent policy of neutrality in an attempt to build their country. [Deleted.]

In Laos, the 1962 agreement on Laos was to create a situation in Laos where all the foreigners get out and leave those people alone. We are convinced that, if you leave the Laotians to themselves, they are not going to tear each other to pieces in internal fighting. They are just not that kind of people. So, the whole purpose there is to get the North Vietnamese out, to get all the foreigners out, including ourselves. We took our 666 military people out in connection with the Geneva accords in 1962.

Now, in the case of South Vietnam, if the north would leave the south alone, there is no problem. We would get out. We would get out. But we haven't been able yet to bring Hanoi and Peiping to that essential decision that they must leave their southern neighbors alone.

And that is the whole purpose of our effects there over a period of years.

Senator ERVIN. I would like to ask one question of either Secretary McNamara or General Wheeler.

Do we have evidence or intelligence to the effect that Red China's submarines are present or operating in the Gulf of Tonkin?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, we do not, Senator Ervin.

General WHEELER. No.

Senator ERVIN. Do we have evidence or intelligence that they have submarine bases in that general area?

Secretary McNAMARA. No. Not in a formal sense. I suppose they could use port facilities but their bases are north.

Senator ERVIN. Thank you, that is all.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Williams?

Senator WILLIAMS. [Deleted.]

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

General WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Thurmond?

U.S. ACTION WAS NECESSARY AND HONORABLE

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I was—I just want to say that I think the action that we took over there was absolutely necessary, and that we couldn't have done anything else to preserve the honor of this country and the security of this Nation.

I expect to support this resolution.

I am concerned about the situation in general, however, in whether we are taking steps that will eventually bring freedom to that area and whether we are going to have to continue to maintain forces there indefinitely as we now are doing in Korea.

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I would just like to ask the Secretary of Defense, do we have a policy to win the Vietnam war, so we can get out of there, or are we going to stay in there indefinitely?

U.S. HOPES TO WITHDRAW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

Secretary McNAMARA. Our policy is a simple one as Secretary Rusk has stated. It is our objective to move our forces as rapidly out of Vietnam as that Government can maintain its independence and as rapidly as the North Vietnamese stop their attempts to subvert it.

Senator THURMOND. I believe Secretary Rusk stated that since 1954 the North Vietnamese Government has been trying to take over South Vietnam. I believe Secretary McNamara stated that they have proof the North Vietnamese Government has been trying to subvert the Government of South Vietnam; that has been an organized effort and infiltration of South Vietnam by sea from North Vietnam.

There have been over 140 instances. We are there, our people are there, working with the South Vietnamese defending and they are responding to aggression.

The North Vietnamese are coming down south of the 17th parallel to wage aggression and we merely defend.

When are we going to get on the initiative there and win this war and get out?

Maybe Secretary Rusk knows the policy on that. Would you care to answer that?

U.S. POLICY MUST BE TO ASSIST ASIANS

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, I think a highly relevant factor here is that there are a billion and a half people of Asia, half of them in the Communist world and half of them in the free world. I don't see how we are going to get a long-range solution to this problem on the basis of our trying to go in there, into this vast mass of people, and try to do a job as Americans in lieu of Asians. I think that it is important for us to try to assist those Asians who are determined to be free and independent to put themselves in a position to be secure.

Now, there have been a lot of situations in this postwar period which could easily have gone to a larger war: the pressures on Iran in 1945, and the Greek guerrilla situation a year later, the Malayan episode, where some external support for the Communists was occurring.

These and other problems have all been troublesome and difficult and hard to manage, but the end result, it seems to me, ought to be a stable situation with free and independent nations capable of maintaining their own security, rather than to try to bring everything to a great cataclysm because, on that basis, there isn't much to settle any more in terms of organized societies maintaining their own independence.

So, I think we have to stay with this effort which has been successful in a considerable number of places around the world since 1945. We can't now say what the future is going to hold in southeast Asia, because the other side is making its own decisions, and will have its own attitude, but I think there is much to be said for a persistence and a

determination to put other people in a position to maintain their security.

Senator THURMOND. Are we in South Vietnam at the request of South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

U.S. OBJECTION TO DIEM POLICIES

Senator THURMOND. Well, I understood President Diem's administration wanted to go north of the 17th parallel, and that was one reason that may have toppled that government over there.

We objected to that. His brother wanted to send guerrilla forces up there. They felt it was necessary to eliminate communism over there in order to have any stability and peace.

I understand now that General Khanh wants to go above the 17th parallel and eliminate communism so that he can bring about stability and peace.

But our Government objected then and objects now to such course, is that true?

Secretary RUSK. Do you want to comment initially on that?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; I want to comment on that. I don't know of any desire of President Diem to go north, Senator Thurmond. I don't recall ever having heard him say that. He certainly did not say that to me when I met with him. I don't recall any statements from him that was his purpose or that he thought his country would be served by any such action.

General Wheeler, do you know anything as far as President Diem is concerned?

General WHEELER. On the occasion I talked to him he was deeply concerned with eradicating communism in South Vietnam, Senator. He didn't even mention the north.

Secretary McNAMARA. Secondly, as to President Khanh, I met with him along with General Taylor in March of this year as well as in May and I specifically asked him his views on actions by South Vietnam against the north, and at that time he stated he did not believe that it would be in the interests of his country to undertake such action.

That he felt the war against the Vietcong must be won in the south. That at some point in the future it might be necessary to supplement that action with action in the north, depending on the action of the North Vietnamese, but he didn't think the situation at that time warranted such action.

Since then I see from his public statements he has been giving more thought to action against the north. But it is my impression from the reports we have, of conversations with him, that he recognizes it would be desirable to concentrate his resources on combating the Vietcong in the south.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

I would like to ask Secretary Rusk if General Khanh and the leaders there in South Vietnam, at whose invitation we are in South Vietnam, feel it is necessary to eliminate communism there and go to the source of it in North Vietnam, the primary source, then would our Government object?

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EFFORTS SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Secretary Rusk. In the first place there is a tremendous job to be done in South Vietnam itself even if he had already determined to go north.

In other words, there are a lot of steps there, and the steps which would be necessary as preparation for going north are very close to the very steps that are needed to make going north unnecessary, because you have got to deal with the security of the countryside, and the security of the principal centers, in South Vietnam itself, in order to stand the shock of any such effort.

But again, I don't myself believe that now is the time for us to, on our side by our own initiative, to enlarge this war on the theory that that is the way to bring about peace in southeast Asia and give these people a chance to be secure and independent on their own.

Senator THURMOND. General MacArthur was not allowed to go north of the 38th parallel in Korea and destroy communism, which he wanted to do, and I think if he had been allowed to do it, would have prevented all the trouble we are having now.

My judgment is that we are just heading for another Korea there, that we are going to have a stalemate, and, if so, we are going to have to keep forces in there for years and years, indefinitely, unless we go to the source of it and eliminate it, and I just hate to see this. It is going to cost this country thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of dollars, and we are going to have to keep forces over there for years and years, unless we go ahead and strike at the heart of the trouble which, as I understand, South Vietnam wants to do, and it seems to me this is a very important decision.

In other words, I think we ought to make up our minds that we are going to have victory in the war in Vietnam or get out.

I think we ought to have victory in the war in South Vietnam, and I think it can be done without bringing on any general war.

I think if we are firm with the Communists, that we can win the war over there. The way we are handling the matter now, I don't foresee victory. I foresee another Korea and I just want to say that for the record.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Church?

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, as one who has spent a couple of years in that part of the world I just want to say that I wholeheartedly support the position taken by the Secretary of State.

AMERICAN WAR IN ASIA IS UNDESIRABLE

I think it would be the height of folly to believe that American war on the Asian Continent, particularly for a western nation against Asians could have any durable result that would be tenable or successful.

Now, I have three questions that I would like to ask.

First, Secretary McNamara, you said in your testimony that the patrol is being resumed and will continue its normal course.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. Does this mean that these ships will be leaving the area where these incidents have occurred?

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, the patrol requires that they carry on a certain number of hours of operation in certain areas, and they will be back in approximately this area later this week.

Senator CHURCH. Will they continue to patrol these waters?

Secretary McNAMARA. They will continue to patrol south of here during daylight hours and approximately this course during night hours advancing to sea, during daylight hours approaching a course approximately—approximating that and presenting from the other direction.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator yield just for a factual question?

Senator CHURCH. May I finish my question because I am late for another committee hearing I am supposed to be conducting.

There were reports in the news last night to the effect that Chinese nationalist sources had reported that the Chinese Communists had moved 200,000 troops to the border and 70 missiles to Hainan Island. Do we have an indication from our own intelligence that these reports are accurate?

Secretary McNAMARA. We do not.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary Rusk, we had very precise information on the military phase of this situation and I think you would want to give as equally precise information on the diplomatic phase and there is one other area here raised by Senator Morse to some degree. [Deleted.]

Secretary RUSK. [Deleted.]

Senator CHURCH. [Deleted.]

Secretary RUSK. [Deleted.]

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MORSE. Could I ask in his question one question of fact on patrol?

Senator SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go to a meeting.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Also the Secretary is committed to go to a House meeting. We will have some other representatives who will stay but the Secretary has agreed to open, I believe, the House meeting.

Next is Senator Byrd of West Virginia.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. I would like to ask a question of Secretary Rusk first of all.

Mr. Secretary, is there any indication that the South Vietnamese are becoming more enthusiastic about pressing this war to victory?

Secretary RUSK. There have been some statements, public statements, by General Khanh and one or two others, following that commemoration which they held out there about 2 weeks ago of the partition of the country.

That, I think, got some of them thinking about the split between north and south and their relatives, and their other national interests in the north. But we do not get the impression that this is a widespread desire throughout the countryside or among the people, and nor do we get the impression that this is a responsible recommendation from an operational point of view on the part of the government.

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SOVIET ADHERENCE TO TEST BAN TREATY

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Secretary Rusk, is there any indication that the Russians are not fully living up to their obligations under the test ban treaty at this point?

Secretary Rusk. No, sir; we have no evidence of violations of the test ban treaty.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Secretary McNamara, are we prepared for eventualities that might occur in Korea and Berlin in conjunction with the situation that is developing in the area of North Vietnam.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; I believe we are. We have had very substantial increases in both our ground and air forces.

As a matter of fact, in our Navy as well, over the past 3 years, and this has given us a capability for preparing for action on all of those fronts.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Do you, Mr. Secretary, feel that while there is a possibility that there is any likelihood at this point, at least, of some difficulties developing in Korea and Berlin at the same time we are having trouble in Vietnam?

Secretary McNAMARA. I see no evidence of any preparations by the Soviets or the Communist Chinese for such action but I think we must be prepared for whatever develops.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I support the action that has been taken by the President, and I add my compliments to those that have previously been expressed by other members. I intend to support the resolution as I have supported similar resolutions in the past.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Thank you.

Senator Mundt?

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, on page two, I would call your attention to your statement which says on Monday, August 3, the President made public instructions he had issued the day before, and then I will skip the part that does not particularly concern me, to number B, to read on Monday, August 3, the President made public instructions that he had issued the day before to attack any force which attacked them in international waters.

What kind of instructions were they operating under on August 1 and 2?

U.S. CRAFT AUTHORIZED TO PROTECT THEMSELVES

Secretary McNAMARA. They were operating under all of the instructions that all of our forces operate worldwide to fire when attacked and to defend themselves. But lest there be—

Senator MUNDT. I would have assumed so but your statement indicates that was issued on August 3.

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir; it doesn't. Quite the contrary.

Senator MUNDT. How do you read the contrary into it?

Secretary McNAMARA. Because my statement indicates that the instructions issued on August 3 were designed to clarify any ambiguity that might have existed in the August 1 and standing instructions regarding destruction of the attacking force.

The normal instruction, the rules of engagements for our forces worldwide, are to protect themselves. When attacked, to protect yourself, defend yourself in any way necessary.

These have been longstanding rules of engagements for years and years. The President wanted to make it perfectly clear.

Senator MUNDT. Will you explain that—

Secretary McNAMARA. Let me finish my statement. I am still answering, if I may.

Senator MUNDT. All right; go ahead.

Secretary McNAMARA. The President wanted to make perfectly clear that, in addition to defending the force, he wanted the force to destroy the attackers. Those are two entirely separate actions, and it was to make that clear that the instruction was sent out on August 4—or I should say on August 2, Sunday.

Senator MUNDT. Then am I to understand on August 1, and prior thereto, they were to attack any force which attacked them in international waters without trying to destroy the defending force?

Secretary McNAMARA. They were to defend themselves and drive it off, and if in driving, the First was not necessary to pursue and destroy if their mission required them to take other action.

In this case this mission was a patrol mission and it was perfectly appropriate and they continued their patrol after they drove off the attacking force but the President wanted them to go beyond that and not resume the patrol until they had endeavored to destroy the attacking force.

Senator MUNDT. In other words, the only new aspect then was part B rather than A?

Secretary McNAMARA. Exactly so.

Senator MUNDT. So that as I read into it "A" was also part of the instructions that had been made at the time on August 3. If you say otherwise OK, but I think the average reader is going to agree with me that this is a new element because it is listed under the heading of the new instructions.

Secretary McNAMARA. All I can say is it is not a new element. General Wheeler can tell you of the longstanding rules of engagement which existed for decades.

Senator MUNDT. I am not arguing about conditions there but I am reading as a normal student of the English language what you convey by your statement.

You don't always convey what is in your mind; neither do I.

Secretary McNAMARA. The facts in the record are clear, I think.

CHANGE IN AMERICAN ARMY OPERATIONS

Senator MUNDT. Now, I would like to ask this question: What different policies or programs or maneuvers, if any, are we taking on land in Vietnam as a consequence of this very brazen attack which we have answered properly on the sea?

General WHEELER. Shall I answer?

General Westmoreland met the other day with General Khanh and his principal military advisers and they agreed that they should go on the alert with all of the Vietnamese forces particularly in port areas, around airfields, and in other sensitive supply areas or operational areas.

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To this end General Khanh has always—has all his troops in barracks on alert. He has alert forces ready to move on 30-minutes' notice in critical areas. They are establishing a special patrol in the Saigon River area in order to guard against mines and things of that sort.

They are particularly sensitive about the POL facilities in South Vietnam. They are establishing a special guard there. In addition to that, as I believe you know, sir, we have moved fighter-interceptor aircraft into South Vietnam as well as some fighter-bomber aircraft into South Vietnam, and in addition we have alerted and are moving—we have alerted certain ground elements for follow-on in case they are needed.

Senator MUNDT. One final question, General, what can you tell us from our intelligence concerning the reaction of the North Vietnamese through the strike we made on them by air?

General WHEELER. There has been no reaction that we know of to date.

In other words, they have not increased their activity either in South Vietnam or in North Vietnam. I would assume they are on a very tight air alert status fearing we might do something again although we have not, and do not contemplate it.

Senator MUNDT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Young?

Senator YOUNG. I have no questions.

I shall support the resolution, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Thank you.

Senator SMATHERS?

Senator SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, first I want to commend the President and the Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the decision which they made, its decisiveness, its effectiveness, and its prudence. I certainly shall support the resolution.

Two questions: First, what has been—or is it too early to determine—the reaction to our action in Japan, with the Government of Japan, and with the Government of the Philippines? I am particularly interested in those two areas.

ALLIES SUPPORT U.S. ACTION

Secretary RUSK. The Government of the Philippines gave us wholehearted support on this, very glad to see the action taken.

In Japan the attitude was that taken in many countries around the world, complete understanding of the necessity of the action.

The Japanese Government referred to this as inevitable, this response. But on the other hand, expressed some strong hope that this itself would not lead to a major escalation of the war. We have had that right around the world, a high degree of understanding of the necessity for the counteraction, and also a hope that it will not escalate.

Senator SMATHERS. One further question. Up to this point have you had any unfavorable reaction with respect to our action from that area from any of the governments in that area of the world?

Secretary RUSK. The free world nations in that entire region have been strongly in support. We haven't heard from Sukarno yet.

Senator SMATHERS. All right. General Wheeler, what is the submarine capability of the Red Chinese in that area?

General WHEELER. They have nothing that I know of in that area, Senator, their submarine bases are generally to the north. This doesn't mean they couldn't move some submarine units down into the Gulf of Tonkin and I would assume operate from ports on the island of Hainan if they cared to do so.

Senator SMATHERS. What is their submarine capability overall?

General WHEELER. I can't give the numbers offhand. I can supply it for the record.

Secretary McNAMARA. It is limited.

General WHEELER. I was thinking in terms of [deleted] units.

Secretary McNAMARA. My recollection is that it is around [deleted].

Chairman RUSSELL. It is more than that, Mr. Secretary. It is around [deleted]. Of course, some of them are very limited in their operational area.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. But the last statistics were [deleted] some odd, and [deleted] of them are long range.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

The others are so short range that they cannot get down to the area and operate effectively.

Senator SMATHERS. Can we have it supplied for the record?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Inouye?

Senator INOUE. I have just one question for clarification.

Secretary McNAMARA, you just stated your formal policy has been to defend if attacked and now it is defend and destroy if attacked. The testimony also shows that in both cases, both attacks, our ships did not respond until torpedoes were fired.

Does this mean from now on we will have to await until the adversary fires either a burst of machinegun or fires a torpedo before we respond?

U.S. CRAFT TO RESPOND TO FUTURE THREATS

Secretary McNAMARA. No, the commanders have been instructed to defend themselves if there is an indication of hostile intent from opposing—opposition forces.

Senator INOUE. You don't have to wait for a positive act?

Secretary McNAMARA. No.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Well, does that complete the hearing?

Anyone have any questions?

Senator MORSE. The Secretary can go. I thought he ought to tell us in the establishment of patrols of our ships, how close they will come to the North Vietnam border. The other day the Secretary testified that the ships at a time were within 11 miles, which shows we did not recognize their 12-mile limit, and the record will speak for itself.

But I think it will show at some times we were less than 11 miles, but beyond 3 miles.

Are we taking the position of the 3-mile limit, which has to be right, disputed by some. When you reestablish these patrols how close do these ships come to the North Vietnam ports?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, perhaps General Wheeler can stay for a few minutes and answer any questions.

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Chairman FULBRIGHT. General Wheeler?

Secretary RUSK. [Deleted] miles.

General WHEELER. [Deleted] miles is the answer.

Senator MORSE. I just want to say it is too close if you want to keep yourself in position and not be subject to the charge of provocation.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Does anyone have any other factual questions to ask?

Senator STENNIS. Senator Cooper came in and he may have one.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I need to leave. I would like for us to bring the resolution to a vote.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. The committee is open to a motion.

Senator SMATHERS. I so move.

Senator SPARKMAN. I so move a favorable report.

Senator LAUSCHE. I second it.

Senator MORSE. I ask for a rollcall.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I might say this. I might have a very short amendment. But I can do it on the floor. I will vote for it now.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have included in the record the statement which I made on this issue yesterday on the floor of the Senate, if one of the staff men will look in the record.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Without objection it will be entered in the record.

(The statement referred to follows:)

[From the Congressional Record, August 5, 1964]

SOUTHEAST ASIA PROBLEM

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I desire to speak briefly concerning the grave problem facing us in southeast Asia.

The course adopted by the President is not of his choosing, but has been forced upon him and our Nation by the offenses committed by the Communists of North Vietnam. Our ship that was attacked was in international waters, where it had a right to be free from attacks by North Vietnam or any other nation. Neither in the interests of the security of our country nor in the proper maintenance of our honor can we afford a course of action other than the one adopted.

Southeast Asia is our first line of defense; when an enemy attacks us there, he is, in principle, attacking us on our native land. To pull out of southeast Asia would be to surrender that entire area to the Communists. Not only would it mean the capture of South Vietnam and the other lands that once were French Indochina, but it also would definitely endanger all of the lands occupied by friends of the West, including the Philippines and Australia. The stakes are graver than is generally understood. A second course would be to convert South Vietnam into a coalition government made up of friends of the West, Communists, and neutrals. Three-headed governments of this type have always been taken over by the Communists, because the Communists do not keep either the spirit or the letter of their promises.

In 1954, Indochina was broken into small nations; pursuant to solemn promises made by the Communists, Laos was to be independent, and Vietnam was to be divided into North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Never has Communist China or Communist North Vietnam kept its word in the fulfillment of the 1954 Geneva agreement. In 1962, we yielded in Laos, and established a three-headed coalition government, only to realistically discover, within a short time thereafter, that the Communists would not cooperate to maintain the coalition reign.

If we yield to the Communists in their attack upon our country's honor, we definitely shall lose the respect of the people of the world who want to be with us, not with the Reds. We shall also bring the enemy materially closer to our shores. Above everything else, our problem will not be solved or bettered, but in fact, will be substantially worsened. I am convinced that Congress will overwhelmingly stand by the President in the decision which has been made. To do otherwise would be to manifest a will not to resist lawless, unwarranted, and unjustified attacks upon our sovereignty.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. The staff will call the roll.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Sparkman?
Senator SPARKMAN. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Humphrey?
Chairman FULBRIGHT. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Mansfield?
Chairman FULBRIGHT. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Morse?
Senator MORSE. No.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Long?
Senator STENNIS. I have his proxy. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Gore?
Mr. Lausche?
Senator LAUSCHE. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Church.
Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Church stated he wanted to vote "Aye."
Senator SMATHERS. I would like to vote Senator Gore "Aye." I know he wants to vote for it.
Chairman FULBRIGHT. Mr. Symington gave me his proxy.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Symington?
Chairman FULBRIGHT. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Dodd?
Mr. Smathers?
Senator SMATHERS. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Hickenlooper?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Aiken?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would ask Senator Aiken be asked how he wants to vote. He did not leave his proxy with me.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Carlson?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Williams?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Mundt.
Senator MUNDT. Aye.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Fulbright?
Chairman FULBRIGHT. Aye.
Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Byrd of Virginia?
Mr. Stennis?
Senator STENNIS. Aye.
Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Symington?
Senator JACKSON. He announced "aye."
Chairman FULBRIGHT. He is on both lists—on both committees.
Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Jackson?
Senator JACKSON. Aye.
Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Ervin?
Senator ERVIN. Aye.
Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Thurmond?
Senator THURMOND. Aye.
Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. Byrd of West Virginia?
Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Aye.
Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Young of Ohio?

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Chairman RUSSELL. He stated he wanted aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Inouye?

Senator INOUE. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mrs. Smith?

Senator SALTONSTALL. She did not leave her proxy with me but I would like to have her recorded as voting aye and, Mr. Darden, will you check that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, why don't we call them?

Chairman RUSSELL. I was going to suggest when we conclude the call of the roll we contact Senator Byrd's office and Senator Cannon because I am sure they would want to vote.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. We will hold it open until the staff can contact the offices.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Beall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would say the same about Mr. Beall.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Goldwater?

Mr. Case?

Senator CASE. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Aye.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman—

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Just a moment until he announces the vote.

Mr. HOLT. The Foreign Relations Committee 14 yeas and 1 nay.

Mr. DARDEN. Armed Services is all yeas with some uncertainties.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. They are to be checked.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are you going to contact Senator Goldwater? I saw Senator Goldwater this morning and he unofficially told me we ought to support it.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will call their offices.

We will undertake to contact them.

Senator THURMOND. Have these statements been sanitized?

Chairman FULBRIGHT. This is an executive record.

Chairman RUSSELL. These are.

Senator MORSE. These statements say "Not for publication."

Chairman FULBRIGHT. It is my understanding—

Senator THURMOND. I am informed they already have been released.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am quite sure these are not classified.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. I thought you were referring to the record.

Senator CASE. These are OK.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Isn't that right, Mr. Holt?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman. I think we ought to—you will see McNamara's statement says not to be released.

Chairman RUSSELL. He has given them to the press but they can't release it until released by these two committees meeting.

Senator MORSE. I move they be released.

Senator THURMOND. Senator Russell, can I take these out, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. You are absolutely safe, sir, so far as the statements by Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary McNamara.

Senator MORSE. I move they be released.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. All in favor say aye.

Opposed no.